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Abstract With the ever-growing popularity of sharing
economy platforms, complementors increasingly face the
challenge to manage their reputation on different platforms. The paper reports the results from an experimental
online survey to investigate how and under which conditions online reputation is effective to engender trust across
platform boundaries. It shows that (1) cross-platform signaling is in fact a viable strategy to engender trust and that
(2) its effectiveness crucially depends on source–target fit.
Implications for three stakeholders are discussed. First,
platform complementors may benefit from importing reputation, especially when they have just started on a new
platform and have not earned on-site reputation yet. The
results also show, however, that importing reputation (even
if it is excellent) may be detrimental if there occurs
a mismatch between source and target and that, hence, fit is
of utmost importance. Second, regulatory authorities may
consider reputation portability as a means to make platform
boundaries more permeable and hence to tackle lock-in
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effects. Third, platform operators may employ cross-platform signaling as a competitive lever.
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1 Introduction
Platforms for selling, renting, and servicing have become a
popular alternative to conventional e-commerce channels
(Van Alstyne et al. 2016; Sundararajan 2016). Services
such as Airbnb for accommodation sharing, BlaBlaCar for
ride sharing, eBay for commodity exchange, and Uber for
on-demand mobility enable the exchange of spare resources among (private) individuals. At its core, a platform
connects consumers (or users) to providers (or complementors) of products and services (Eisenmann et al. 2008).
Platform-based businesses have raised billions in venture
capital and exhibit strong market valuations [e.g., Uber:
$69bn; Airbnb: $31bn; (Zijm et al. 2019)], often exceeding
those of long-established industry incumbents. Recent
studies on annual consumer spending (e.g., €17.2bn for
resale goods; €6.6bn for renting accommodation), growth
rates (50–100%), and overall market volume within the
sharing economy (€570bn until 2025) underpin this
development (EU 2017; PwC 2016).
Importantly, complementors need to establish a reputation on the platforms they operate on and a majority is
active on multiple platforms (Hesse and Teubner 2019;
Teubner et al. 2019). At that, they rely on the reputation
they build within the boundaries of a specific platform. In
view of the broad and highly specialized spectrum of
platforms, complementors find themselves managing many
separate reputations (Dakhlia et al. 2016). There is
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typically no technical integration across platforms, leading
to friction, intransparencies, and increased transaction costs
(Botsman 2012). Hence, the possibility to transfer reputation across platforms could provide substantial value to
complementors. In particular, enabling such cross-platform
signaling may help to overcome the inherent ‘‘cold start’’
problem when starting to use a new platform (Wessel et al.
2017). Also for platform operators, this strategy may
constitute a competitive lever to win over complementors
from other platforms (Eisenmann et al. 2006) and to enable
them to facilitate additional transactions and enforce
profitable prices early on (Wessel et al. 2017). Already
back in the 1990s, Amazon.com allowed its complementors to import ratings from eBay but discontinued this
service after eBay claimed that the ratings were their
proprietary content (Resnick et al. 2000). As of 2019,
several e-commerce platforms have indeed implemented
import functions for user ratings from other platforms (e.g.,
Bonanza.com, Truegether.com). What is more, also the
European Commission identifies cross-platform data and
reputation portability as an important means to address
issues of data ownership, lock-in effects, and platform
competition (EU 2017, p. 93).
Here, however, the question arises whether (and if so,
how) reputation is effective for engendering trust across
platforms. Research on this matter, however, is scarce.
While cross-platform signaling may be readily implemented technically, it is not clear whether reputation is
actually transferable from a psychological perspective, that
is, whether users will accept signals from external sources.
Against this backdrop, we address the question of how and
under which conditions online reputation represents an
effective signal for trust-building across platform
boundaries.
To do so, we develop and evaluate a research model in
which we consider whether the availability of cross-platform reputation engenders users’ trust in complementors.
To this end, we draw on signaling theory (Dimoka et al.
2012; Spence 2002) and extend prior work on trust transfer
(Chen and Shen 2015; Kelley 1973; Lim et al. 2006; Sia
et al. 2009). Specifically, we assess how users evaluate
prospective complementors when those have not collected
any ratings on a specific (target) platform, but have gathered reputation on another (source) platform. We benchmark this scenario against two control conditions in which
complementors have either gathered (1) reputation on the
platform or (2) no reputation at all. In particular, we argue
that users’ perceptions of source–target fit promote the
effectiveness of cross-platform reputation. To evaluate our
hypotheses, we conduct an experimental online survey in
which participants consider to transact with a prospective
complementor.
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The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, while
previous research primarily considered reputation within a
particular platform environment (Resnick and Zeckhauser
2002), our study delivers important insights into how user
reputation may function across platforms. In particular, we
show that the positive relationships between signal availability, trust, and purchasing intentions extend to crossplatform signaling. Moreover, we disentangle the effects of
cross-platform reputation from the effect of the platform’s
trustworthiness (i.e., trust transfer). Second, we show that
the effectiveness of cross-platform signaling hinges on
users’ perceptions of source–target fit. In doing so, we
enrich the tenets of signaling theory by providing first
evidence on the importance of these boundary conditions
and expand its scope to multi-platform applications. We
discuss our findings’ practical and strategic implications
for platforms, complementors, users, and regulatory
authorities.

2 Theoretical Background and Related Work
2.1 Trust and Trust Transfer
Trust is commonly referred to as the willingness to
accept vulnerability due to others’ actions based on
expectations about their intentions and skills (Gefen
2002; Gefen et al. 2000; Rousseau et al. (1998). It represents a critical construct for virtually all areas of
e-commerce (Bolton et al. 2013; McKnight et al. 2002),
and particularly for transactions between private individuals (Ert et al. 2016; Lu et al. 2010). Due to the
inherent risks in Internet-facilitated transactions, users
engage in transactions only if they believe that the other
party will not exploit their vulnerability and behave
opportunistically. This belief is conceptualized as a
user’s trust in the complementor. Due to its pivotal role
for purchase intentions, researchers have explored a wide
range of mechanisms (e.g., star ratings, escrow services)
that platforms can implement towards this end (Chen
et al. 2015; Pavlou and Gefen 2004).
One important factor in this regard is the level of trust
users have in the platform. Here, trust transfer refers to the
notion that complementors ‘‘inherit’’ trustworthiness from
the platform they operate on (Chen et al. 2015; Pavlou and
Gefen 2004). This transference of trust is a ‘‘cognitive
process in which one’s trust in a familiar target can be
transferred to another target by virtue of certain associations’’ (Chen et al. 2015, p. 264). Hence, everything else
being equal, users are more likely to trust complementors if
they trust the intermediary because ‘‘a trusted intermediary
can also be expected to take steps to reduce buyer risk’’
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(Pavlou and Gefen 2004, p. 44).1 Several studies have
described how trust transfer is realized in cases of missing
information on a particular actor (Chen and Shen 2015;
Chen et al. 2015; Lim et al. 2006; Pavlou and Gefen 2004).
For e-commerce, it was found that users’ trust transfers
from an e-commerce platform (trust source) to complementors on the platform (trustees) (Chen et al. 2015;
Pavlou and Gefen 2004; Verhagen et al. 2006). The process
of trust transfer from platforms to complementors has been
studied for several contexts, including Taobao (Chen et al.
2015) and other e-vendor websites (Kim 2014), typically
finding positive effects. Similarly, several studies specifically considering Airbnb, Uber, and eBay showed that trust
in a platform is an effective driver of trust in complementors and purchase intentions (Han et al. 2016; Hong
and Cho 2011; Mittendorf 2017; Verhagen et al. 2006).
2.2 Reputation
Beyond the platform’s trustworthiness, presumably the
most important factor for the formation of trust in complementors is their reputation. We refer to reputation as a
complementor’s accumulated and documented evaluation
by prior transaction partners (Jarvenpaa et al. 2000; Kim
et al. 2004). The success of an individual seller, host, or
driver crucially depends on how well they are regarded by
potential users (e.g., buyers, guests, passengers). To allow
for reputation to establish, platforms employ various systems (Jøsang et al. 2007; Resnick et al. 2000). Typically,
these systems let parties rate each other (Jøsang 2007,
p. 209). By accumulating the individual experiences of
previous transactions, such ratings lend themselves well for
user assessment (Havakhor et al. 2016). Also, by employing
simplified numerical logics (such as star ratings), aggregated scores provide an intuitive measure (Zervas et al.
2015). While the intricacies of user ratings, in particular
positivity bias (‘‘reputation inflation’’), are subject to
ongoing discussion, they have become table stakes on many
platforms (Gutt et al. 2019). Consequently, designing and
understanding reputation systems and their implications for
online marketplaces ‘‘has become a first-order question in
the digital economy’’ (Filippas et al. 2018, p. 2).
2.3 Signaling Theory
The formation of trust based on reputation is often
explained by signaling theory (Akerlof 1970; Riegelsberger
et al. 2005; Spence 2002). The main rationale of the theory
1

In this regard, quality control mechanisms such as Uber’s policy to
expel drivers with a rating below 4.6 stars or Airbnb’s background
checks on new hosts provide a rationale for the effectiveness of trust
transfer (Airbnb 2017; BusinessInsider 2015).
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posits that one party can reduce another’s uncertainty by
providing a signal. This assumes two parties with (at least
partially) diverging interests and asymmetric information.
This scenario is typical for buyer–seller and user–complementor relations where the buyer/user cannot assess a
product’s or service’s quality prior to the transaction
(Ghose 2009).
To reduce information asymmetry, complementors can
send different types of signals. One type relies on the
assessment by a third party such as prior transaction partners (Basoglu and Hess 2014; Donath 2007; Dunham 2011;
Ma et al. 2017). User ratings thus represent common and
relatively reliable signals. Extant research has shown that
ratings function as an antecedent of trust in various contexts, including online sales (Kim et al. 2008, 2004) and
accommodation sharing (Ert et al. 2016). The importance
of signals for trust and the realization of transactions
becomes particularly clear when considering the information asymmetry on such platforms (Ert et al. 2016). As
such, users face considerable levels of economic and social
exposure, for instance, when sharing a car or flat for many
hours or even days (Hawlitschek et al. 2016a). In this
regard, reputation is found to be particularly important for
service provision as the delivered quality will very much
hinge on the complementor’s skills, goodwill, and integrity
(Dimoka et al. 2012).
2.4 Cross-Platform Signaling
While there has been extensive research on the importance
of signals for reputation within a given, enclosed platform
environment, the question of whether and how reputation
exerts an influence across platforms has received only little
research attention thus far. Several scholars conducted
requirement analyses and proposed mathematical models
of how to aggregate reputation from dispersed sources
(Grinshpoun et al. 2009; Mishra 1995; Pingel and Steinbrecher 2008). Further, there have been attempts to evaluate such models based on empirical data (Gal-Oz et al.
2010) and to predict trust in one context based on the
reputation scores from another context (Kokkodis and
Ipeirotis 2016; Venkatadri et al. 2016). For instance, in the
context of crowd work, it has been shown that a worker’s
performance can be predicted by prior, category-specific
feedback scores, suggesting cross-context transferability of
peer-based online reputation (Kokkodis and Ipeirotis
2016). Similarly, it has been proposed to leverage user data
from social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) to
make inferences about user legitimacy and hence to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy users on other
platforms (Venkatadri et al. 2016). Most recently, Otto
et al. (2018) considered the effect of star ratings from an
external platform for ride sharing, finding support for the
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cross-platform effectiveness of online reputation. Importantly, they focus on one specific combination of
source platform (accommodation sharing) and target platform (ride sharing). For a conceptual and more comprehensive overview of cross-platform signaling, we refer to
Hesse and Teubner (2019).
In sum, prior research has thus far either completely
neglected the role of user perception or was limited to one
specific platform combination. As we show in this paper,
however, the effectiveness of cross-platform signaling does
not only rely on the mere existence of reputation but also
on users’ perception of how well its origin matches the
target context. Hence, this study differs from previous
studies in that it directly evaluates cross-platform signaling
from a user-centered perspective and accounts for platform-specific differences as well as the boundary condition
of source–target fit.

3 Hypotheses Development
In the following, we develop our hypotheses for users’
trust with cross-platform signaling (Fig. 1). Extending the
literature on trust transfer, we consider trust in the complementor as a result of a cross-platform signal’s availability (H1) and user perceptions of source–target fit
between the involved platforms (H2). Given the large and
consistent body of evidence with regard to the concept of
trust transfer and the positive relation between trust and
purchase intentions, we consider these relations as sufficiently established and refrain from stipulating separate
hypotheses. Appendix A (available online via http://link.
springer.com) provides definitions and items of all
constructs.
3.1 Relation Between Cross-Platform Signal
Availability and Trust in Complementor (H1)
For users of sharing economy platforms, trust in complementors can be interpreted as the positive belief in the
complementors’ ability, integrity, and benevolence
(Hawlitschek et al. 2016b). According to signaling theory,

Trust Transfer

Trust in Platform

Signaling Theory

XPS Availability

Reputation Transfer

Perceived
Source-Target Fit

the availability of a reliable signal (e.g., a user rating from
a prior transaction in the reputation system of a platform)
can reduce uncertainty and thus help to foster trust. Now,
given that a complementor operates on several platforms
and has collected positive ratings on at least one of those
platforms, we suggest that these ratings can, to some
extent, be leveraged as cross-platform signals. As reputation systems summarize ratings from past transactions with
various users (Jøsang et al. 2007), they convey a certain
amount of generalizable information on skills, goodwill,
and integrity that is likely to be considered as relevant on
other sharing platforms as well. For successful service
provision on various sharing platforms, there may hence
exist an intuitive set of properties, skills, and attitudes
which would benefit complementors within basically any
platform (e.g., reliability, communication skills, cleanliness, etc.). We thus suggest that the general availability of
positive reputational information – independent from its
source platform or context – represents a meaningful signal
and thus positively influences trusting beliefs.
H1 Cross-platform signal availability is associated with
increased trust in the complementor.
3.2 Relation Between Source–Target Fit and Trust
in Complementor (H2)
The way in which a reputational signal creates meaning
needs to be considered against the context it is evaluated in
(Hendrikx et al. 2015). When investigating how a complementor’s reputation on a (source) platform serves as a
signal for users to trust them on a different (target) platform, it is hence important to take potential contextual
differences between source and target into account. In other
words, just because a complementor is able to refer to an
existing reputation may not necessarily imply that this
reputation will also be perceived as a meaningful signal,
applicable to the target platform. Source–Target Fit refers
to the user’s perception of how applicable a signal from the
source platform is for transactions on the target platform
(i.e., perceptions of consistency or congruency between the
target and source domain) (Aaker and Keller 1990; Dens

(+)

H1(+)

Trust in
Complementor

H2(+)

Intention
to Purchase

Control Variables
Age

Fig. 1 Conceptual research model. Note: XPS = cross-platform signaling

123

(+)

Gender

Disposition
to Trust

Risk
Propensity

Complementor’s
Gender

T. Teubner et al.: Unlocking Online Reputation, Bus Inf Syst Eng 62(6):501–513 (2020)

and De Pelsmacker 2010). Perceived fit was identified ‘‘as
the prime determinant of success’’ for the extension of
business activities to new contexts (Arikan et al. 2016,
p. 930). High levels of fit may exist for platforms from the
same or similar domains or when the associated operations,
tasks, and requirements are perceived as similar, that is,
when there exists some degree of overlap or comparability.
From the theoretical perspective, the psychological concept
of categorization underpins this reasoning. Categorization
refers to a cognitive heuristic to deal with (overwhelmingly) large amounts of stimuli (Boush and Loken 1991).
Categorization, in this sense, represents a process of cognitive ‘‘pigeonholing’’ to structure and simplify one’s
environment (Shaw 1990). When facing a novel instance,
which, however is associated with a known category, ‘‘the
attitude associated with that category can be transferred to
the new instance’’ (Boush and Loken 1991, p. 18). Naturally, high levels of fit are likely to be reflected in similar
cognitive categorization. Conversely, a lack of fit may
result in ineffectiveness of reputation for building trust
within the target context (Dong et al. 2007). In this vein,
Aaker and Keller (1990) stated that ‘‘if the fit is incongruous, the extension may be regarded as humorous or
ridiculous’’ (p. 30).
We argue that a similar cognitive categorization takes
place when users assess the applicability of an existing
reputation score for the trustworthiness of that complementor on a different platform. In particular, the personal
qualities of being regarded as a well-reputed driver on
Uber, for instance, may be perceived as well-transferable to
other ride sharing platforms, whereas being regarded as a
well-reputed eBay seller may be seen as less transferable to
accommodation sharing. A higher level of fit suggests that
the original skills and personal characteristics which were
responsible for building a reputation on platform A in the
first place, will be applicable on platform B too – as the
tasks, challenges, and requirements on B are similar to
those of A. We hence posit:

platform signaling (XPS) scenario, the complementor has
not accumulated any ratings on the (target) platform, but on
another (source) platform. Third, in an additional control
condition (CTRyes), the complementor has accumulated
ratings on the respective target platform. Figure 2 illustrates this treatment design, wherein the cells on the
diagonal represent the CTRyes control conditions and the
lower row represents the CTRno control conditions. All
other cells represent the various XPS conditions with the
respective combinations of source and target platform. We
employ a between subjects design, that is, any subject is
exposed to exactly one of the treatment conditions. We
provide an overview of all main variables across treatments
in Appendix B.
To create variety with regard to our focus variables and
to avoid the limitations associated with constraining the
study to one specific platform, we consider four platforms.
To present participants with easy-to-relate-to scenarios, we
consider the platforms Airbnb (accommodation sharing),
BlaBlaCar (ride sharing), eBay (commodity exchange),
and Uber (taxi service). Note that this selection of platforms also promises some degree of variance with regard to
fit between platforms which is an important condition in
order to study its effect on trust. Within the XPS treatment,
we consider all 12 combinations of source and target
platforms.
4.1 Stimulus Material
Each participant sees one complementor profile on one of
the four target platforms and is asked to consider it. To
minimize confounding effects, the stimulus material is
presented in view of the following design considerations.
1.

H2 Higher levels of source–target fit are associated with
increased trust in the complementor.

4 Method
To evaluate our hypotheses, we conduct an experimental
online survey in which participants take the role of
prospective users (i.e., buyers, guests, or passengers)
deciding whether or not to engage in a transaction with a
prospective complementor (i.e., driver, host, or seller). We
consider three main treatment conditions. First, in the ‘‘no
signal’’ control condition (CTRno), the complementor has
not accumulated any ratings at all. Second, in the cross-
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2.

3.

The overwhelming majority of ratings on most
platforms are five stars (Abramova et al. 2017; Gutt
and Kundisch 2016). Since our study addresses crossplatform signaling for complementors and these are not
likely to actively take ‘‘bad’’ ratings along to a
different platform, we focus on 5 star scores. Moreover, also in the control condition with ratings on the
respective platforms (CTRyes), a rating score of five
stars is used. While this represents a natural starting
point for future research, we deliberately focus on this
practically most relevant scenario.
In order to create a reasonably realistic scenario and
also to charge the displayed rating score with sufficient
reliability, the rating score is based on 24 reviews. This
number is informed by prior research and represents
the 75%-quantile within Airbnb ratings (Teubner et al.
2017).
The introductory text describes the scenario verbally:
(a) ‘‘The user has received 24 reviews on «target
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Target
Platform

Platform
Logo

Michael
Online Reputaon

Source platform

Treatment
Configuration

Platform Logo

(24)

Platform Logo

(-)

Source
Platform

Target platform
BlaBlaCar

eBay

Uber

Airbnb

CTRyes

XPS

XPS

XPS

BlaBlaCar

XPS

CTRyes

XPS

XPS

eBay

XPS

XPS

CTRyes

XPS

Uber

XPS

XPS

XPS

CTRyes

—

CTRno

CTRno

CTRno

CTRno

platform»’’ (CTRyes), (b) ‘‘The user has not received
any ratings or reviews on «target platform» yet.
However, the user’s «source platform» profile with
24 reviews is linked up’’ (XPS), (c) ‘‘The user has not
received any reviews or ratings on «target platform»
yet.’’ (CTRno). The placeholders are filled by the
respective platform names.
Profile images were found to affect users’ perceptions
and decisions (Ert et al. 2016). Since we focus on the
effects of transaction-based reputation, profile image
effects should be minimized. We contend that to create
vivid and engaging scenarios, such basic elements
should, however, not be omitted entirely. The displayed profile images are hence blurred, avoiding
confounding effects due to factors such as attractiveness, visual trustworthiness, or similarity. To control
for potential gender effects induced by the stimulus
material, both male and female profiles are used. The
displayed names are drawn from a set of common first
names.
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(-)

Airbnb

Fig. 2 Stimulus material and treatment design. Note: Treatment
configuration: CTRno = lower bound control condition with no signal
at all; CTRyes = upper bound control condition with signal available

4.

Platform Logo

on target platform; XPS = cross-platform signaling; for publication,
platform logos have been replaced by placeholders

4.2 Procedure, Measures, and Sample
Altogether, 408 participants were recruited by email from a
student subject pool as platforms are particularly attractive
to young, well-educated, and tech-savvy users (EU 2017;
Mittendorf et al. 2019). Five respondents were removed
from the dataset as they did not pass attention checks. The
final sample hence includes 403 participants (111 female,
292 male, mean age = 24.42 years). A more detailed
overview of the sample and its allocation to the treatment
conditions is provided in Appendix B. The sample size was
determined along the following considerations. Our
experiment constitutes a between-subjects design with
three different treatment conditions (CTRno, CTRyes, XPS).
Participants were randomly allocated to these three main
treatments. However, it needs to be considered that our
design also involves different source–target platform
combinations as sources of variation for users’ perceived
source–target fit. As shown in Fig. 2, there are 4
(CTRno) ? 4 (CTRyes) ? 12 (XPS) = 20 cells, that is,
combinations. Assuming an effect size of d = .25, a = .05,
and power = .80, this requires a sample size of 360 to
compare these cells (Faul et al. 2007). Our sample size
hence surpasses this requirement by a margin of about
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10%. The number of participants per treatment conditions
reflects the notion that the number of cells in the XPS
condition is three times larger than in each of the two
control conditions. Overall, the XPS conditions comprise
241 participants, where both the CTRyes and the CTRno
conditions comprise 81 participants each.
As an incentive for participation, 22 randomly selected
respondents received a cash payoff (2 9 €50; 20 9 €20).
After clicking on the survey link in the invitation email,
and providing informed consent to take part, participants
were introduced to the scenario. Then, participants saw the
randomly generated profile in the upper part of the screen.
Questionnaire items were displayed in random order in the
lower part of the screen in blocks of eight items. To
operationalize our theoretical constructs, we adapted validated scales. Appendix A provides a summary of all constructs and items. In addition to the model’s main
constructs, we assess participants’ gender, risk propensity
(Dohmen et al. 2011), disposition to trust (Gefen 2000),
and familiarity with the respective platform (Gefen and
Straub 2004) as control variables.

5 Results
5.1 Manipulation Checks
To confirm that our manipulation yielded a range of
responses with regard to trust in platform and source–target
fit, Fig. 3 compares these values for the different platforms
and combinations. Individual trust in platform ranges
between 1 and 7, that is, on the full range of the 7-point
Likert scales (mean = 4.61; standard deviation = 1.27).
Similarly, individual fit values range between 1 and 7
(mean = 4.34; standard deviation = 1.53).
Note that source–target fit values only exist for the XPS
condition (241 observations). To test whether our manipulation (i.e., source- and target platform) successfully
created different levels of perceived source–target fit, we
grouped the values in the XPS condition by the four source
and target platforms (Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, eBay, Uber),
yielding 4 9 3=12 different conditions. A one-way
ANOVA reveals significant variation with regard to this
factor (F(11, 229) = 5.76, p \ .001). A post hoc Tukey test
reveals that, in short, there are 11 (out of the 66 possible)
significant differences between groups, the largest of which
are between BlaBlaCar/Uber and eBay/Uber (D = 2.72,
p \ .001) as well as between Uber/BlaBlaCar and eBay/
Uber (D = 2.15, p \ .001). Table 1 shows all average
values of source–target fit for the various combinations of
source- and target platform in the XPS conditions.
Importantly, the degree of perceived source–target fit is
somewhat sensitive to direction. One could argue in favor
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of a symmetric degree of fit based on the assumption that it
emerges (inter alia) from common requirements. These
may be based on skills, traits, attitudes, and the like. If,
now, two platforms require a certain skill, a reputation
earned in one should be effective as a signaling device
within the other – and vice versa. However, it appears
unlikely that the sets of required skills, traits, and attitudes
will be exactly congruent. Hence, cases in which the
required properties for one platform represents a subset of
the other are easily conceivable (A , B). In such cases,
source–target fit would be higher in one (B ? A) than in
the other direction. In fact, the data confirm that a high
degree of source–target fit from platform A to B (e.g.,
Uber ? eBay: 3.98) does not necessarily imply equally
high fit for the reverse (e.g., eBay ? Uber: 2.96). To
underpin this asymmetry of source–target fit statistically,
we re-arranged the data from Table 1 and correlated each
fit value (from A to B) with its opposite counterpart (i.e.,
from B to A). This correlation on aggregated level with all
possible platform combinations (n = 6) is insignificant
(Pearson’s r(4) = .77, p = .073). Given that this analysis is
based on 6 pairs of platforms only, we ran an additional
Spearman correlation test, yielding similar results (Spearman’s r = .75, p = .08). Similarly, when randomly pairing
individual users of opposing source–target combinations, a
correlation between the respective fit levels is also
insignificant (Pearson’s r; (107) = .164, p = .088; based on
2,000 runs).
5.2 Testing Hypothesis H1
To evaluate H1, we benchmark trust in the complementor
in the cross-platform signaling condition against the two
control conditions. As shown in Fig. 4, trust in the complementor is markedly higher in the CTRyes condition
(M = 4.93, SD = 0.99) and markedly lower in the CTRno
condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.20) than it is in the crossplatform signaling condition (M = 4.21, SD = 1.09).
Noteworthy, this observation is (by and large) consistent
across platforms. A two-way between-subjects 3 (CTRno,
XPS, CTRyes) 9 4 (Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, eBay, Uber)
ANOVA confirms this visual assessment. We observe a
significant effect of treatment on trust (F(2, 397) = 23.80,
p \ .001). In support of H1, a post hoc Tukey test confirms
that XPS yields significantly higher levels of trust than
CTRno (D = .44, p \ .01). Given the 1-to-7 points Likert
scale, this amounts to 38% of the difference between onsite reputation and having no reputation at all (CTRyes–
CTR.
One interesting finding here is that, in contrast to the
overall trust-promoting effect of reputation transfer,
importing an eBay rating to Uber yields lower trust than
not having any rating at all – even though the imported
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Target Platform

Target Platform

Airbnb
BlaBlaCar
eBay
Uber

Airbnb
BlaBlaCar
eBay
Uber

CTRNO

Fig. 3 Manipulation checks for trust in platform and source–target
fit. Note: Colored dots indicate mean values; standard errors indicated
by error bars. Both x- and y-axis reflect 7-point Likert scales. Linear
estimate and 95% confidence interval indicated by dotted line and

CTRYES

XPS

grey area. CTRNO = no reputation was displayed; CTRYES = reputation stems from the target platform itself; XPS = cross-platform
signaling

Table 1 Average values for source–target fit in the cross-platform signaling condition
Source/target

Airbnb

BlaBlaCar

eBay

Uber

Airbnb
BlaBlaCar

–

4.94 (1.21)

4.33 (1.70)

4.33 (1.49)

4.83 (1.44)

–

4.26 (1.54)

5.68 (1.39)

eBay

4.60 (1.30)

4.15 (1.41)

–

2.96 (1.29)

Uber

3.75 (1.45)

5.12 (0.80)

3.98 (1.36)

–

Standard deviation in parentheses; n = 241 (out of 403)

reputation is a straight 5-star rating. Note that this case also
yields the overall lowest value of source–target fit
(eBay ? Uber: 2.95). We will come back to this peculiar
finding in the discussion.

Now, to evaluate H2, we zoom in on the treatment condition with cross-platform signaling. Specifically, we use
covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM)

6

Trust in Complementor

Fig. 4 Average values of trust
in complementor compared
between cross-platform
signaling and control
conditions. Note: Colored dots
within the grey bars indicate
source platform. CTRNO = no
reputation was displayed;
CTRYES = reputation originated
from the target platform itself;
XPS = cross-platform signaling

5.3 Testing Hypothesis H2

CTRYES

XPS

CTRNO

Source Platform

5

4

3

2
Airbnb

BlaBlaCar

Target Platform
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eBay
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Table 2 Construct descriptives, reliability measures, and correlations
Descriptives

Composite reliability

Cronbach’s alpha

AVE

Correlation matrix

Mean

SD

1

2

3

Intention to purchase (1)

5.13

1.31

.97

.96

.92

–

Trust in complementor (2)

4.21

1.09

.86

.75

.67

.70

Trust in platform (3)

4.61

1.27

.90

.78

.82

.47

.49

–

Source–target fit (4)

4.34

1.53

.96

.93

.88

.56

.65

.31

4

–
–

AVE average variance extracted, SD standard deviation; n = 241 (out of 403)

to evaluate this part of the research model (R, lavaan).
Note that for the assessment of H2, only the XPS treatment
conditions apply since the concept of source–target fit is
not meaningful when there is no source platform (such as
the case in the control conditions). Hence, the number of
observations for testing H2 is 241 rather than 403, which
represents the sum of all participants in the XPS cells in
Fig. 2. Table 2 provides construct descriptives, reliability
measures, and correlations.
The assessment of the measurement model indicated
good fit with regard to conventional thresholds [Adjusted
Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = .88; Comparative Fit
Index (CFI) = .98; Tucker–Lewis Index (TLI) = .98; Root
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .04]
(Hair et al. 2010). In line with H2, we find that higher
source–target fit is associated with higher levels of trust in
the complementor in case a cross-platform signal is available (b = .55, p \ .001). This effect can be considered as
‘‘large’’ (Urbach and Ahlemann 2010). Moreover, as
expected, we find positive relations between users’ trust in
the platform and trust in complementor (b = .31, p \ .001)
as well as between trust and purchase intentions (b = .80,
p \ .001). Finally, there occurs no significant interaction
between trust in platform and source–target fit on trust in
the complementor.
5.4 Control Variable Analysis
We consider several control variables including age, disposition to trust, gender, familiarity with the platform, and
risk propensity. Also, we control for the complementor’s
gender. We observe three significant effects. First, users’
general disposition to trust is positively related to their
trust in the complementor (b = .25, p \ .001). Second, also
risk propensity is positively associated with trust in
the complementor (b = .15, p \ .01). Third, female profiles are associated with increased trust (b = .12, p \ .01).
Importantly, the control variables only exert small and
moderate effects (Urbach and Ahlemann 2010) and the
main hypothesized relations are unaffected by using/removing the control variables in/from the model. Thus, the

conclusions derived from this study do not critically hinge
on individual sample characteristics such as age, gender,
disposition to trust, and risk propensity.

6 Discussion
6.1 Summary of Results and Contribution
As the spectrum of the sharing economy has broadened
from commodity exchange to a large variety of experience
goods and services, complementors increasingly manage
separate online identities. Reputation can be understood as
part of their capital for attracting demand – or, more generally speaking – as a catalyst for transactions. Constraining reputation to a specific platform is hence at the charge
of complementors, where it becomes ‘‘impossible for
[them] to capitalize on their reputation [and] when they are
moving to another platform, they are starting from scratch’’
(Scholz 2016, p. 20). This impedes the formation of trust,
inhibits the realization of mutually beneficial transactions,
and hence yields economic inefficiency. By studying the
effectiveness of cross-platform signaling from a user psychology perspective, this study provides novel insights
which we discuss in the following.
First, prior research has primarily focused on reputation
and trust within confined platform boundaries (e.g., Ert
et al. 2016). However, such studies did either not take into
account the role of user perceptions (Grinshpoun et al.
2009; Mishra 1995; Pingel and Steinbrecher 2008) or the
role of boundary conditions (Otto et al. 2018). Extending
this research by considering various combinations of
source and target platforms with varying levels of fit, we
show that, overall, the availability of a rating score does in
fact exert a trust-building effect across platform boundaries, ultimately translating into purchase intentions (H1;
see also Figs. 3, 4).
Second, by considering different source–target combinations, we shed light on how specifically reputation
engenders trust. In particular, we show that the effectiveness of signals relies on users’ perception of source–target
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fit between the respective platforms (H2; see also Fig. 3,
right-hand side). Most prior work on signaling within the
sharing economy is based on an implicit assumption of
(high) fit. However, the diversity of today’s platform
landscape necessitates an assessment that goes beyond this
assumption and individual cases. Thereby, as we have seen,
source–target fit can vary substantially, also concerning the
direction of the source–target relation (see Table 1). This
may be due to the specific sets of skills, traits, and attitudes
responsible for successful provision in the different contexts (e.g., driving, care, punctuality, cleanliness, etc.).
These sets may in part be distinct, overlapping, or one
may represent a subset of another. It is straightforward to
conclude that a good reputation for an activity requiring
many skills/traits will flow well towards an activity with
fewer or less complex requirements – but not the opposite
way around. In such a case, the attitudes and skills represented by the (albeit excellent) ratings from one platform
may simply not be of predictive value on another.
Interestingly, a low source–target fit can even yield lower
levels of trust than not having any reputation at all (see Fig. 4;
eBay to Uber). We can only speculate what causes this. One
line of reasoning may be that users perceive that the complementor is misleadingly trying to capitalize on a reputation
that is too remote from the intended context. Supporting this
line of interpretation, there is evidence that misplaced objects
or actions are often found to be perceived as aggravating or
ridiculous (Aaker and Keller 1990). Similar to a company
attempting to extend its product line to an entirely non-fitting
domain,2 complementors attempting to leverage their ratings
on other platforms may fail miserably if the very idea of
linking the contexts is perceived as being too far of a stretch.
Moreover, while a platform’s trustworthiness itself also
impacts trust between users and complementors, this relation does not moderate the effectiveness of cross-platform
signaling, making reputation import strategies viable for
less renowned, potentially less trusted entrant platforms.
Control variable analysis indicates that our findings are
robust against socio-demographic factors such as users’
age, gender, and general trusting disposition.
6.2 Practical Implications
Beyond the theoretical lens, these results have important
practical implications for complementors, platforms, and
regulatory authorities. First of all, complementors can in
fact benefit from referring to existing reputation by providing a link or reference within their profile. When doing
so, they may want to emphasize similarities between

2
See Zippo’s attempt to market a women’s perfume (Austin 2013);
Who would not want to smell like lighter fluid?!
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contexts and applicability (e.g., highlighting the complementarity of skills).
Moreover, platforms can also leverage this information
for their benefit. Platform operators may, for instance,
provide an import function, allowing complementors to
integrate external signals in a structured and reliable
manner. In fact, the US-based e-commerce platforms
Bonanza.com and Truegether.com offer such functions for
importing ratings from eBay. Alike complementors, platforms may want to emphasize why and how imported
signals are well-applicable to their own specific context.
In a more general sense, cross-platform signaling may
mitigate platform lock-in, enable data ownership and
portability, and hence stimulate competition in a domain
that tends to develop monopolies due to the presence of
positive network effects (Eisenmann et al. 2006). Hence,
from a strategic perspective, cross-platform signaling may
serve as a competitive lever to lower entry barriers, win
over users and complementors from other (potentially
competing) platforms, and facilitate multi-homing (Eisenmann et al. 2006). It may also help to overcome the platform-typical cold-start problem (i.e., complementors not
being credible and trustworthy due to a lack of reputation)
and hence represent a viable strategy for platform launch
(Stummer et al. 2018). For non-competing platforms,
bidirectional cross-platform signaling (i.e., ‘‘reputation
sharing’’) may represent a mutually beneficial strategy of
cooperation.
Naturally, such strategic considerations prompt questions of how platforms may and would counteract adversarial reputation transfers, that is, the use of reputation data
from within their system without their consent. First,
especially large incumbents who have already seized considerable market power may have little interest in letting
other platforms ‘‘drain’’ their reputation data. Second, also
the import side may be skeptical, especially when complementors reference to their reputation on a competing
platform as such references may be regarded as an implicit
means of advertisement. One potential way forward here
could be that smaller platforms use cross-platform signaling to facilitate the entrance for new complementors by
temporarily ‘‘borrowing’’ the trust users have in the referred platform. In this vein, to address the double-edged
sword of reputation transfer, platforms could allow for
cross-platform signaling only until the complementor has
achieved a certain level of on-site reputation (e.g., five
ratings/reviews), and then remove this possibility.
While the 2017 EU report emphasizes the potential
upsides of reputation portability (EU 2017, p. 93), others
have argued that consumer welfare could be impaired
(Swire and Lagos 2013). Notwithstanding these considerations, the EU General Data Protection Regulation
implemented in May 2018 has introduced a right of data
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portability as one of its most notable features. In particular,
Article 20 grants individuals the right ‘‘to receive the
personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has
provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used
and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit
those data to another controller without hindrance from the
controller to which the personal data have been provided’’
(European Parliament 2016, p. 144). While the regulation
intends to reduce prohibitive switching costs, associated
lock-in, and to ensure platform competition, it is not
explicitly geared towards reputational data. Moreover, it
targets personal data which was ‘‘produced’’ by individuals
themselves (e.g., Facebook updates) (Kathuria and Lai
2018). An individual’s transaction-based reputation, however, is not provided or produced by them, but by other
individuals. For those individuals who have created this
data (e.g., written a text review), it is rather unlikely that
there occurs any demand for data portability (Kathuria and
Lai 2018). Fundamentally, the notion of cross-platform
signaling also raises the question who actually owns the
reputational information (e.g., the complementor, the
platform, the originator); a much and controversially discussed subject in jurisprudence (Graef 2016). We contribute to this debate by showing that cross-platform
signaling is indeed effective. Hence, regulatory authorities
may build on this finding and consider explicitly granting
the right to transmit reputational information to other
platforms.

platforms such as social or business networks and there
may also exist reputation within the target platform and on
other platforms. As we have focused on rather well-known
platforms, future research may take less acquainted or
completely unknown sources into account.
A further limitation relates to the present study’s sample. Like many other studies, our research draws on a
student-based subject pool, implying some limitation in
diversity, especially with regard to age and education. For
the purpose of studying peer-based platforms, this limitation may not be all too stark given that many (while of
course not all) of those platforms’ users lean towards the
young and well-educated end (Akbar et al. 2016; EU 2017;
Mittendorf et al. 2019).
Finally, as this paper has focussed on the user’s perspective, future research should consider the determinants
of cross-platform signaling from the opposite, that is, the
complementor’s perspective, as well. Given the different
levels of economic exposure for users and complementors,
the role of reputation may be quite different for this
opposite perspective. Also, other boundary conditions
beyond fit may be relevant when a complementor evaluates
a user’s request – given that a) the user’s role is more
passive but b) economic and/or social exposure for the
complementor may be higher (e.g., on Airbnb).

6.3 Limitations and Future Research

As our study shows, reputation does transfer between platforms and it is up to the platform operators’ information
systems and their user interface design to allow for such
transfers to occur. Compared to the control conditions of
within-platform and non-existent signals, we find the overall
levels of trust and purchase intentions to range between those
poles for cross-platform signals. By connecting this finding to
established theoretical concepts, this study contributes to a
more thorough understanding of managing reputation across
platforms and provides the means to leverage reputational
capital for entering new ones. Based on the foundations of
signaling theory, we show that users’ perception of source–
target fit represents an important driver of the effectiveness of
cross-platform signaling. Consequently, our research supports
scholars, complementors, platforms, regulators, and users in
understanding, designing for, and maintaining trust within the
sharing economy.

Like any research, this study has limitations. As we point
out in the following paragraphs, many of these limitations
provide viable starting points for future work. First, while
we operationalized reputation by means of a simple
numerical score, most current sharing platforms provide
further mechanisms and cues to build trust between users
and complementors. Examples include text-based reviews,
identity verification, and social network integration
(Abramova et al. 2017). Since many platforms exhibit
skewed distributions towards positive rating scores, we
have focussed on the most common value (5 out of 5 stars).
Future research may hence consider other, that is, lower
rating scores. In this regard, however, it needs to be noted
that a bad reputation is not likely to be carried along deliberately by any complementor – raising the intriguing
question of involuntary reputation drag-along; similar to
China’s social scoring system (Campbell 2019).
Second, in addition to the focus on one type of reputational information, this study considers only one source at a
time. However, users may have accounts and reputation
scores on more than one other platform (Teubner et al.
2019). Importantly, this may include non-e-commerce

7 Conclusion
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